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THE FINANCING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER
REVISED UCC ARTICLE 9
STEVEN 0. WEISE*
[The rule of section 9-318(4)] can be regarded as a revolutionary de-
parture only by those who still cherish the hope that we may yet re-
turn to the views entertained some two hundred years ago by the
Court of King's Bench.'
Article 92 facilitates the ability of owners of rights in property to
obtain financing secured by that property. The revisions to Article 9
seek to facilitate secured financing by
• simplifying the procedures for obtaining and perfecting se-
curity interests in personal property,
* bringing predictability and certainty to the results of these
transactions, and
* lowering transaction costs.
At the same time, the Drafting Committee for Revised Article 9
(the "Drafting Committee") recognized that implementing these
goals in connection with the creation and enforcement of security in-
terests in rights in intellectual property will often affect the rights of
third parties not parties to the transaction, such as the owners and us-
ers of the intellectual property. The Drafting Committee took great
care to balance the overall goals of Article 9 with the interests of
these persons.
The Drafting Committee extensively reviewed the methods of fi-
nancing used for intellectual property.' This review included existing
* Steven Weise was the American Bar Association Advisor to the Article 9 Drafting
Committee. He, along with Harry C. Sigman, took special responsibility for considering issues
relating to security interests in intellectual property. He is a member of the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code. He is a member of Heller Ehrman White & McAu-
liffe in Los Angeles. John D. Berchild, Steven L. Harris, Robert Ihne, Donald J. Rapson, and
Harry C. Sigman each provided many helpful comments and insights concerning this article. All
views are those of the author.
1. U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 4.
2. All references and citations in this article to UCC Article 9 are to Revised Article 9
unless otherwise indicated. For emphasis, this article frequently makes express reference to
"Revised" Article 9. In the footnotes, Former Article 9 is cited as "U.C.C. § 9-XXX" while the
revised Article is cited as "R. § 9-XXX."
3. Substantially all of the discussions on these issues involved software and motion picture
financing. Most of the examples given in this article will involve those industries. These issues
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and anticipated patterns of financing for this type of property. The
Drafting Committee developed a set of rules that recognize and bal-
ance the rights of each of the persons affected by the creation, perfec-
tion, and enforcement of a security interest in rights in intellectual
property.
This article reviews practices of financing secured by these types
of property and how the Article 9 Drafting Committee addressed and
balanced the interests of each of the persons affected by the transac-
tion. The Drafting Committee arrived at a set of even-handed results.
I. THE ARTICLE 9 DRAFTING PROCESS
The consideration of the issues discussed in this article generated
more controversy than most provisions of Revised Article 9. This ar-
ticle will review how the Drafting Committee considered and re-
solved those issues.
The Article 9 Reporters, members of the Drafting Committee,
and others directly involved in the Article 9 revision process had
many communications with licensors and licensees of intellectual
property, the Reporter and Drafting Committee Chair for the pro-
posed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
("UCITA"), 4 the ABA's Intellectual Property Section, and other per-
sons active in the UCITA process. Representatives of leading soft-
ware financing institutions made presentations to the Drafting Com-
mittee. These communications provided very helpful information to
the Drafting Committee and resulted in changes to the relevant pro-
visions of Revised Article 9 to accommodate and balance the various
interests.
The Intellectual Property Section of the ABA took an active role
commenting on the provisions of Revised Article 9 that directly ad-
dress intellectual property issues. That Section is very sensitive to the
concerns of licensors of intellectual property, including software. That
Section initially expressed some concerns about the provisions of Ar-
ticle 9 that directly affect the financing of intellectual property. In re-
sponse to those concerns, the Drafting Committee made several im-
portant revisions and clarifications to Article 9 that are discussed
are not limited to those industries and the issues affect financing of many kinds of intangible
property. For example, the Drafting Committee also took into account the interests of parties to
governmental and private franchises and licenses not involving intellectual property.
4. UCITA was formerly referred to as UCC Article 2B. The relevance of UCITA is dis-
cussed below.
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below. After extensive consideration of the issues, the Intellectual
Property Section determined that Article 9 strikes an appropriate
balance and decided to support Article 9.
II. SCOPE QUESTIONS
A. General
Article 9 does not apply to all financing of intellectual property
nor does it apply to all aspects of the financing of intellectual prop-
erty. This section will review the scope of the application of Article 9
to the financing of intellectual property.
B. The Application of Federal Law
Intellectual property often exists in a form subject to federal
regulation, such as copyright law. Recent decisions, primarily in the
West, have held that the Copyright Act preempts the application of
Article 9 to the extent that federal law supplies a different rule.'
When the collateral is a copyright, the prudent secured party will
likely seek to perfect its security interest both by recording a copy-
right mortgage in the Federal Copyright Office and by making a filing
of a UCC financing statement in the appropriate state. 6 This article
5. See, e.g., National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine
Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1990); In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R.
517, 521 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997). However, the courts have consistently held that the UCC gov-
erns the perfection of a security interest in a patent or a trademark for purposes of defeating the
claims of a lien creditor, including a trustee in bankruptcy. See In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc. v.
Matsco, Inc., 239 B.R. 917 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (patent); In re Together Dev. Corp., 227 B.R.
439, 442 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) (trademarks); In re Transportation Design & Tech., Inc., 48
B.R. 635, 639 (Bankr. S.D. Calif. 1985) (patents); see also R. § 9-109(c)(1) (recognizing federal
preemption of Article 9 to the extent of actual preemption).
6. Section 9-316 provides (in part) that when a debtor transfers the "collateral" to a per-
son "located" in another state, a security interest perfected by the filing of a UCC financing
statement in the debtor's state becomes unperfected if the secured party does not file a UCC
financing statement in the second state within one year. See R. § 9-316(a)(3). Some concern has
been expressed that a secured party in a transaction would file a financing statement against an
owner of intellectual property in the state of the debtor's location, probably the state of incor-
poration under Revised Article 9. See id. §§ 9-301, 9-307. The owner of the intellectual property
would then enter into an exclusive license with a licensee in another state, and concern was ex-
pressed that the license would trigger this rule as involving a transfer of the copyright itself. If
that were correct, the secured party would have to file a UCC financing statement in the new
state within one year for every license. Under Peregrine and Avalon, the only way to perfect a
security interest in a copyright and the proceeds of the copyright (including accounts) is to file a
copyright mortgage under the Federal Copyright Act. See In re Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 199; In re
Avalon, 209 B.R. at 521. These decisions (if correct) indicate that the filing of a UCC financing
statement means absolutely nothing. Thus, under Peregrine and Avalon, section 9-316 (though
not the UCC as a whole) is irrelevant to the perfection of a security interest when the intellec-
tual property collateral is a copyright. Even if the UCC does apply to these transactions, a true
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will generally review the effect of Revised Article 97 on these transac-




The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws ("NCCUSL") has approved a new uniform law, UCITA, to
cover "computer information transactions. 9 UCITA has been ap-
proved by its sponsor.10 Until the February 1999 draft of UCITA,
license of the right to use collateral (a copyright in this example) (under both copyright law and
Article 9) is not a "transfer" of the "collateral" itself and does not give the licensee a property
interest in the copyright itself. (Although the copyright is not transferred by the license, the
rights created by the license are "property" for Article 9 purposes, and can serve as collateral
should the licensee grant a security interest in them.) A security interest attaches only to the
debtor's rights in the collateral. See R. § 9-203 cmt. 6. Some intellectual property lawyers have
expressed concern that, as a matter of copyright law, under the Copyright Act the grant of an
exclusive license transfers a "property" right to the licensee. Nimmer on Copyright analyzes the
Copyright Act in a manner consistent with the Article 9 analysis. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.02[C][2] & n.51 (1999) (commenting "there is
never more than a single copyright in a work notwithstanding the author's exclusive license of
certain rights"; "an exclusive licensee owns 'separately' only 'the exclusive rights comprised in
the copyright' that are the subject of his license"; "particular 'exclusive rights under a copyright'
do not in themselves constitute a 'copyright"'; and "there is but one copyright in a work re-
gardless of whether and how many exclusive licenses of particular rights thereunder have been
granted"). Thus, for Article 9 purposes, the licensee's property interest is in its rights under the
license, not in the copyright itself. Nimmer makes clear that the licensor remains the "owner of
the copyright" and has not transferred is property by entering into the license. Accordingly, Re-
vised Article 9 produces the same result as copyright law-no filing is necessary by the secured
party of the licensor against the exclusive licensee because the copyright itself has not been
transferred to that person. Even if this analysis were wrong, there is no risk to the secured party
because of section 9-321 (discussed in detail below). Under that section, a nonexclusive licensee
takes its license "free" of the security interest. See R. § 9-321(b). However, an exclusive licensee
obtains no special rights under Revised section 9-321. The secured party of the exclusive licen-
see gets a security interest only in whatever it is the licensee has. What the licensee has is a right
subject to the security interest created by its licensor (including termination by a foreclosure by
the secured party). So in the event of a foreclosure by the secured party of the licensor, the in-
terests of the licensee and its secured party evaporate. Their interests are discharged by the
foreclosure.
7. Revised section 9-109(c)(1) makes clear that Article 9 defers to federal intellectual
property law only "to the extent" that federal law in fact preempts Article 9. Peregrine sug-
gested that Article 9 deferred in its entirety whenever there was any federal rule that applied to
a transaction. See In re Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 199-202.
8. This article will not consider whether decisions such as Peregrine and Avalon reach cor-
rect results. Under federal intellectual property law, a licensee under a nonexclusive license may
not have a "property" interest for certain purposes. Any such rule, however, does not prevent a
security interest under Article 9 from attaching to the licensee's "rights" under the license. For
many decades, the courts have recognized that state law governs security interests in copyrights
generally, even if copyright governs filing.
9. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT prefatory note (1999). Drafts of UCITA
are available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm>.
10. This article cites the 1999 draft of UCITA, Approved and Recommended for Enact-
ment in All States, unless otherwise indicated.
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UCITA contained provisions that overlapped some of the provisions
of Article 9 discussed in this article. Many of the provisions in
UCITA were consistent with those of Article 9. Some were not.
Certain of the major policy issues involved in the financing of in-
tellectual property were debated on the floor of NCCUSL at its an-
nual meeting in July 1998 at the time of the approval of Article 9. The
discussion included references to certain inconsistencies with UCITA
on these points. All of this occurred before the discussion of UCITA.
The policy results were approved during that discussion and vote on
Article 9. Recognizing that NCCUSL had just set policy on these is-
sues by adopting Article 9, the Chair of the UCITA Drafting Com-
mittee announced from the podium at the NCCUSL Annual Meeting
that UCITA would be made "consistent" with Article 9.
In early November 1998, the UCITA Drafting Committee con-
sidered and debated the UCITA Reporter's and Chair's proposal to
make UCITA "consistent" with Article 9 by eliminating all financing
provisions from UCITA. No member of the UCITA Drafting Com-
mittee objected. The February 1999 draft of UCITA formally deleted
these previsions, and the UCITA Drafting Committee approved
those changes at its meeting in February 1999. The UCITA Drafting
Committee also approved a provision in UCITA that now reads: "To
the extent of a conflict between this [Act] and [Article 9], [Article 9]
governs."'1 Thus, both the official text of UCITA and its drafting his-
tory make clear that Article 9 will govern all aspects of a secured
transaction in intellectual property.
D. Is There a "Security Interest"?
The "financing" of the rights of a licensee 2 of intellectual prop-
erty may take a variety of forms. Some of the common financing
structures do not create a security interest, and Article 9 does not ap-
ply to those transactions, leaving them to other law (including
UCITA, if adopted in a state).3 Article 9, of course, will govern a
transaction if its substance is a transaction subject to Article 9, what-
ever form the transaction takes.
11. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 103(c)(2).
12. Transactions in intellectual property typically involve the "licensing" (and not the
"sale") of rights to use the intellectual property.
13. UCITA includes provisions addressing software financing transactions not subject to
Article 9. See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT §§ 103(c)(3), 507-511. This article
does not discuss those provisions.
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1. Software Licensor Finances the Licensee
The simplest structure provides for a software licensor itself to
finance the licensee by allowing the licensee to pay for its rights under
the license over time. Under this structure:
* The licensor enters into a nonexclusive 14 license of software
with a licensee.
* The licensee pays the license fee in installments.
* The licensor has a right to terminate the license 5 if the licen-
see does not make a payment.
16
2. Software Licensor's Affiliate Finances the Licensee Through a
Sublicense
A variation on the first transaction is modeled on "finance lease"
transactions under Article 2A.17 These transactions proceed as fol-
lows:
* A software licensor enters into a nonexclusive license of
software with a financier (often an affiliate of the licensor).
* The financier pays the licensor the fee for the license in full.
* The financier enters into a nonexclusive sublicense 18 of the
software with the ultimate user-sublicensee.
* The sublicensee pays the financier for the sublicense in in-
stallments.
* The financier (sublicensor) has the right to terminate the
sublicense if the sublicensee does not make a payment.
3. Third Party Directly Finances the Licensee Through a Loan to
Licensee
The final principal variation involves a more traditional struc-
ture, with one important difference: there is a loan instead of a subli-
cense.
* The licensor enters into a nonexclusive license of software
14. The meaning of "nonexclusive" is discussed below. See infra Part V.C.
15. In this and the following examples, the "termination" right may be structured as an
agreement by the person receiving the financing to stop using the software.
16. The "termination" provision may contain significant "liquidated damages" provisions
designed to "encourage" the user of the software not to breach the agreement. This article does
not consider the enforceability of those provisions.
17. See U.C.C. §§ 2A-303, 2A-407. In practice, parties to these software transactions often
use "leasing" terminology.
18. This may be referred to as a "lease."
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with licensee.
* The financier (often an affiliate of the licensor) makes a
loan to the licensee.
* The licensee uses the loan proceeds to pay the fee for the li-
cense in full.
* The licensee repays the loan to the financier in installments.
* The financier has the right (under a covenant in the finan-
cier's agreement with the licensee or perhaps with the coop-
eration of licensor) to terminate the license if the licensee
does not make an installment payment.
4. Yes, We Have No "Security Interest"
None of the transactions described in the preceding sections cre-
ates a "security interest." A licensor's right under a nonexclusive 19 li-
cense on default to terminate the license is not a "security interest."
The same conclusion should result from a review of the rights of a
lender to the licensee that obtains termination rights against the licen-
see.
The essence of a "security interest" is "an interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an ob-
ligation. ' '20 If the creditor does not have an interest in personal prop-
erty that the creditor can use to satisfy the debtor's obligation, a "se-
curity interest" does not exist. In each of the transactions described
above, the creditor does not have anything it can use to satisfy the
obligation:
* Where the license provides for deferred payments of the li-
cense fee and provides the licensor the right to terminate the
license upon the licensee's failure to make a required pay-
ment, the transaction generally should not, standing alone,
"create or provide for" a "security interest." The licensor's
right to terminate does not give the licensor anything to sell
that it could not already sell-another nonexclusive license.21
19. The analysis might well be different for an "exclusive" license. There the secured party
of the licensee may have something of value to dispose of upon the licensee's default. The se-
cured party's disposition of the licensee's rights may be subject to possible restrictions. See infra
Part IV.
20. U.C.C. § 1-201(37). Revised Article 9 has not changed this portion of the definition of
"security interest." See R. § 9-102(c).
21. The licensor under a nonexclusive license differs from a "lost volume" seller of goods
under UCC section 2-708 in that the lost volume seller has something of value to resell-the
goods that it manufactured. The licensor in this circumstance incurs no, or a nominal, marginal
cost in entering into a new, additional nonexclusive license.
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Because the license that the lender is terminating was a
nonexclusive license, by definition the licensor can grant an
infinite number of additional nonexclusive licenses, whether
or not it terminates the licensee that is in default.22
* In the second transaction, the sublicense, the same analysis
applies. The sublicensor has nothing of value to sell.
* In the third transaction, a third party provides credit to a
nonexclusive licensee where the third party has an agree-
ment with the licensee that requires the licensee to termi-
nate2 3 its use of the license (and perhaps to have the licensor
cooperate in this endeavor) upon the licensee's default in its
financial obligations to the third party. Similarly the third
party does not have a "security interest." Where the license
is a nonexclusive license, the financing party holding a ter-
mination right still does not have anything to sell if the li-
censee defaults.24 It does not matter who holds the termina-
tion right if that person has no property to look to to obtain
satisfaction of the obligation of the licensee to the creditor.
Some suggested during the Drafting Committee's consideration
of this issue that the licensee in these circumstances needs some pro-
tection and thus Article 9 treatment is necessary to provide that pro-
tection.2 Article 9 cannot and does not undertake to provide proce-
dural protection to all persons who breach a contract and
consequently lose rights under that contract. Article 9 does not pro-
vide protection in transactions not within its scope. The scope of Arti-
cle 9, based on the definition of "security interest" for purposes of
22. UCITA recognizes that the licensor does not "reacquire" anything to resell. UCITA
does not require the licensor of a nonexclusive license to "re-license" the rights and credit the
breaching licensee unless the breach "makes possible a substitute transaction." UNIF.
COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS Acr § 808(b)(1)(B) (1999). That circumstance will rarely
occur with a nonexclusive license.
23. Presumably the licensee's continued use of the license following her termination of use
under that agreement would not only be in breach of that agreement, but also would infringe on
the licensor's rights.
24. A licensor or a third party may, in addition to having a right to terminate a licensee's
rights under a license, also have a security interest in the licensee's rights to secure the licensee's
payment obligations. In that circumstance, the licensor or third party also has a "security inter-
est" with respect to that part of the transaction. The existence of the security interest should not
transform the portion of the transaction consisting of a termination right into a security interest.
A third party holding a termination right and a security interest has value in holding the security
interest because it has something to sell-the licensee's rights under the license. The secured
party's right to enforce its security interest may be subject to restrictions in the license or under
other law. See R. § 9-408(d).
25. UCITA will provide protection to the licensee. See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO.
TRANSACTIONS ACT §§ 801-816.
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Article 9, should not be stretched to cover these transactions for the
purpose of providing protection to the licensee (any more than it
should be stretched to enhance the rights of the financier).
If a right of termination alone does not create a security interest,
then the person holding the termination right would not have to
* file a financing statement to protect its rights because no se-
curity interest exists,26 or
* comply with the Article 9 foreclosure rules. 27
There are, to be sure, transactions that the parties label a license
that do constitute a "security interest."28 For example, an agreement
labeled an exclusive "license" that functions as an outright transfer of
the licensor's intellectual property (e.g., a copyright) would likely
constitute a transfer of ownership and, if the transferee were paying
over time, a "security interest. '29 Thus, an exclusive, worldwide, per-
petual license to use a copyright in all media, etc., would in substance
function as a transfer of the copyright itself.
E. Goods v. Software
Article 9 draws a line between "goods" and "software. ' 30 Where
26. Of course, a financing party might choose, as a matter of prudence, to file a protective
financing statement in order to forestall litigation that might otherwise occur.
27. UCITA places certain limitations on the right of a licensor to use electronic self-help.
See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 816. Article 9 does not contain any similar
provision. However, Article 9 secured parties enforcing their rights are subject to duties of
commercial reasonableness and good faith. The courts have not been sympathetic to secured
parties that stray from the rules. Revised Article 9 defines "good faith" to include the "obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." R. § 9-102(a)(43).
28. The form of the transaction is not determinative of whether Article 9 applies. See
U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (Article 9 applies to a transaction "regardless of its form"); R. § 9-109(a)
(same). Whether title to the personal property resides in one party or another is not relevant in
determining whether Article 9 applies. See U.C.C. § 9-202; R. § 9-202. For example, transactions
which are labeled by the parties as transfers of ownership, leases, bailments, consignments, or
the like, or that adopt the structures of those transactions, are nevertheless governed by Article
9 when the economic effect of the transaction is to create an interest in personal property which
secures payment or performance of an obligation. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
29. Revised section 9-505(a) provides that a person in a transaction that might be classified
as a transaction subject to Article 9 may file a protective financing statement. It should be noted
that this section specifically provides that a licensor may file a protective financing statement
indicating its interest in a license. See R. § 9-505(a).
30. Section 9-102(a)(44) defines "goods" as
all things that are movable when a security interest attaches.... The term also includes
a computer program embedded in goods and any supporting information provided in
connection with a transaction relating to the program if (i) the program is associated
with the goods in such a manner that it customarily is considered part of the goods, or
(ii) by becoming the owner of the goods, a person acquires a right to use the program
in connection with the goods. The term does not include a computer program embed-
ded in goods that consist solely of the medium in which the program is embedded.
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software is "embedded" in goods so that the software becomes "part
of" the goods,31 Article 9 treats the software as "goods" for all pur-
poses under Article 9 (such as how to perfect a security interest and
the buyer in ordinary course rules). When software maintains its in-
dependent status, it will constitute a general intangible.
32
III. THE LICENSOR'S TRANSFER OF ITS PAYMENT RIGHTS
A. How Does Article 9 Classify and Apply to the Licensee's Payment
Obligations?
1. Current Law
Current Article 9 has always applied to the sale of "accounts."33
Revised Article 9 continues this rule. 34 Current Article 9 defines "ac-
counts" to include only payment obligations arising out of the sale or
lease of goods or the provision of services.31 Under current law, this
leaves many kinds of payment rights within the definition of "general
intangible." The sale of these types of payment rights also often
serves as a financing transaction, but Current Article 9 does not apply
to these transactions.
The licensee's payment obligations under a license or a "lease"
of software are a "general intangible" under current law because no
goods or services are involved. The licensee's payment obligations
under a license or a lease are not "chattel paper" under either cur-
rent36 or new37 law because the definition of chattel paper continues to
require a security interest in or lease of "specific goods."38
2. Revised Article 9
Revised Article 9 seeks to facilitate these financing transactions.
Section 9-102(a)(75) defines "software" as "as a computer program and any supporting in-
formation provided in connection with a transaction relating to the program. The term does not
include a computer program that is included in the definition of goods."
31. The test is easy to apply when considering the software that may run the braking sys-
tem in a car. It is more difficult to apply when considering a television set that can access the
Internet.
32. See R. § 9-102(a)(42).
33. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b).
34. See R. § 9-109(a)(3).
35. See U.C.C. § 9-106.
36. See id. § 9-105(1)(b).
37. See R. § 9-102(a)(11).
38. As discussed below in connection with purchase money security interests ("PMSIs"), in
specified circumstances, a security interest in or "lease" of software may form a part of chattel
paper, as may a monetary obligation with respect to software used in the goods.
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Revised Article 9 broadens the definition of "accounts" to include
* payment obligations arising out of the sale, lease, or license
of all kinds of tangible and intangible property (for example,
''accounts" will include license fees payable for the use of
software), and
* credit card receivables.39
Thus, under Revised Article 9, a licensee's payment obligations
under a license or a "lease" of software are an "account" because the
definition of "account" no longer requires a sale or lease of "goods."
4
The broader definition of "account" expands the scope41 of Article 9
by bringing into Article 9 more transactions through the continued
application of Article 9 to the sale of "accounts" (as newly defined).42
Under Current Article 9, the sale of a licensor's right to payment
under a license is not a "security interest" because the definition of
that term covers the sale of accounts and chattel paper but not the
sale of general intangibles.43 The sale" of a licensor's rights is a "secu-
39. See R. § 9-102(a)(2).
40. See id.
41. The scope of Article 9 has expanded in other, similar ways. The inclusion of many kinds
of payment rights in the definition of "accounts" does leave behind in the definition of "general
intangible" some important types of payment rights, such as payment rights that arise out of
loan agreements that do not constitute "instruments." Revised Article 9 calls a general intangi-
ble where the obligor's "principal" obligation is the payment of money a "payment intangible."
See id. § 9-102 (a)( 6 1). The sale of a payment intangible often functions as a financing transac-
tion. Revised Article 9 brings certainty to these transactions by bringing the sale of a "payment
intangible" into the scope of Article 9. See id. § 9-109(a)(3). However, to permit financial insti-
tutions that sell loan participations to avoid the need by buyers of loan participations to file un-
informative financing statements against sellers, who would in many cases otherwise be subject
to thousands of filings, Article 9 provides for the automatic perfection of a security interest cre-
ated upon the sale of a payment intangible (but not a security interest given to secure an obliga-
tion). See id. § 9-309(3).
The sale of a promissory note will also often function as a financing transaction. Revised
Article 9 recognizes this fact and treats the sale of a promissory note as a transaction subject to
Article 9. See id. § 9-109(a)(3). Revised Article 9 defines a "promissory note" as a subset of "in-
struments." See id. § 9-102(a)(65) "Promissory notes" include "promises," but not "order pa-
per" (e.g., checks). See id. As with the buyer of a payment intangible, the buyer of a promissory
note enjoys automatic perfection of its security interest. See id. § 9-309(4). Unlike payment in-
tangibles where there is nothing to possess and the first buyer of the payment intangible will
always have priority, a buyer of a promissory note that relies on automatic perfection and does
not take possession of the promissory note may lose to a subsequent buyer of the promissory
note that does take possession of the promissory note. See id. § 9-330(d). That secured party will
also lose to a holder in due course of the promissory note. See id. § 9-331.
42. Revised Article 9 also clarifies that a seller of accounts (and other property where the
sale is an Article 9 transaction) retains no interest in the property sold. See id. § 9-318(a). This
rejects the holding in Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948, 955-56 (10th Cir.
1993). See PEB COMMENTARY NO. 14, TRANSFER OF ACCOUNTS OR CHATTEL PAPER
(§ 9-102(1)(b)) (1994).
43. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b).
44. Under Current and Revised Article 9, if a "sale" of a payment right (or other property)
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rity interest" under Revised Article 9 because a licensor's rights un-
der a license would come within the expanded definition of "ac-
counts." Revised Article 9 continues to cover the sale of accounts and
chattel paper (along with sale of payment intangibles and promissory
notes).45
B. The Transfer of Payment Rights
1. Transfers of Intangibles
Current section 9-318(4) renders ineffective any restriction pro-
hibiting the assignment of an account (which includes the creation of
a security interest) or the creation of a security interest in a general
intangible for money due or to become due.46 Current section 9-318
permits the free assignment of a right to money, without restriction.
Revised Article 9 builds on this in sections 9-406 and 9-408.47
2. Limitations on Antiassignment Provisions
Revised Article 9 renders wholly ineffective any restriction in an
account, promissory note, payment intangible, or chattel paper, or
under other law, that would interfere with the
* creation or perfection of a security interest 48 in the right to
payment, or
* enforcement of the secured party's security interest in the
right to payment.
49
includes significant recourse by the financing party against the licensor (or other characteristics
not consistent with a "true sale"), the "sale" in substance may constitute a traditional loan by
the financing party to the licensor, secured by the licensor's rights under the license. See U.C.C.
§ 9-502 cmt. 4; R. § 9-318 cmt. 2.
45. See R. § 9-109(a)(3). Because a "sale" by a licensor of its payment rights under the li-
cense (a sale of "accounts") will be a "security interest" under Revised Article 9, the buyer (the
financing party) will have to file a financing statement naming the seller (the licensor) (as
"debtor") to protect the buyer against other buyers from the seller (the licensor) and secured
parties of the seller (the licensor) if the other buyer or secured party files a financing statement
before the first buyer files a financing statement. See id. § 9-322(a)(1). A sale of payment intan-
gibles and a sale of promissory notes will also be a "security interest" but will be automatically
perfected and will automatically defeat lien creditors and most other secured parties. See id.
§ 9-309(3)-(4).
46. Current Article 9 does not invalidate a provision affecting the sale of a general intangi-
ble consisting principally of a right to payment because Current Article 9 does not apply to the
sale of these rights. Plainly the same policy would apply.
47. Section 9-408 is discussed below.
48. These rules do not apply to the sale of a payment intangible or a promissory note. See
R. § 9-406(e). The next section of this article (concerning section 9-408) describes the rules that
apply to the sale of that type of collateral.
49. See id. § 9-406(d), (f). Subsections (d) and (f) of section 9-406 provide:
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Thus, section 9-406 permits the creation and enforcement of a se-
curity interest in a right to payment arising out of a general intangi-
ble, including a license of software, even if the contract or other law
restricts the licensor's right to assign its right to payment.
3. No Material Impairment Test Is Necessary
Some suggested that the licensor's right to assign its payment
rights should be subject to a test based on whether the assignment
materially affected the licensee's expectation of return performance.
The concern here is that if a licensor can assign its right to receive
money, the licensor may lose its incentive to perform its future obliga-
tions under the license, to the detriment of the licensee. Of course,
the licensor's ability to obtain cash in exchange for the assignment of
the payment rights will often provide the funds for the licensor to per-
form those obligations. Section 9-406 carries forward the rule of Cur-
rent section 9-318(4), which has permitted unfettered security inter-
ests in these kinds of rights to payment since Article 9 became
effective, with no apparent ill effects on the account debtor. Section
9-406 reflects the strong public policy in favor of the assignability of
the right to receive money because this enhances the value of the ac-
counts as collateral (to the benefit of the debtor and the account
debtor).
Other legal rules are consistent with section 9-406. Section 317 of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which does refer to a material
(d) ... [A] term in an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor or in a
promissory note is ineffective to the extent that it:
(1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the account debtor or person
obligated on the promissory note to the assignment or transfer of, or the crea-
tion, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in, the ac-
count, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note; or
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the secu-
rity interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, de-
fense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the account, chattel
paper, payment intangible, or promissory note.
(f) ... [A] rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits, restricts, or requires the
consent of a government, governmental body or official, or account debtor to the
assignment or transfer of or creation of a security interest in, an account or chattel
paper is ineffective to the extent that the rule of law, statute, or regulation:
(1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the government, governmental
body or official, or account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or the
creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in the
account or chattel paper; or
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the secu-
rity interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, de-
fense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the account or chat-
tel paper.
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impairment test in respect of assignment of contractual rights, recog-
nizes, in citing Article 9, that "[w]hen the obligor's duty is to pay
money, a change in the person to whom the payment is to be made is
not ordinarily material."50 UCC section 2A-303 states, in the context
of a "true lease," that a lessor's assignment of a right to payment
owed by the lessee, in and of itself, as a matter of law is not a material
impairment of any rights or obligations of the obligee for purposes
that would render an antiassignment clause in a true lease effective.51
A material impairment test would be a significant and unex-
pected burden on secured financings. In financing and capital markets
transactions, holders of performed and unperformed rights to pay-
ment customarily finance and securitize those rights. Lenders and in-
vestors financing unperformed rights to payment account for the
credit risk that the account debtor will not perform its obligation to
pay. But the lenders and investors financing both performed and un-
performed rights to payment would not normally account for the risk,
at least without considerable due diligence and greater expense, that
the assignment of the rights to payment itself is ineffective by virtue of
being a material impairment.
There is no justification for applying a material impairment test
that might nullify a security interest in a licensor's fully earned right
to payment under a license. Even UCC section 2-210(2), which does
contain a material impairment test for the assignment of rights in the
context of the sale of goods, would permit the assignment of "a right
arising out of the assignor's due performance of his entire obligation."
Indeed, this would be the case under UCC section 2-210(2) even if
the sales contract itself prohibited assignment. In any event, Article 2
defers all of its provisions to Article 9,52 and thus no Article 2 material
impairment test would apply to an Article 9 transaction under Cur-
rent Article 9.
4. The Licensee Is Protected
The licensee has other protections. If the circumstances are such
that the licensee is concerned legitimately about the ability of a licen-
sor that assigns rights to payment under Article 9 subsequently to
perform unperformed license obligations, it is possible that the licen-
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 cmt. d (1981).
51. See U.C.C. § 2A-303(3).
52. See U.C.C. § 2-402(3) ("Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the rights of
creditors of the seller (a) under the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article
9) ...."); see also R. § 2-210(3) (as revised as part of the Article 9 revisions).
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see would have reasonable grounds for insecurity. The licensee might
then demand that the licensor provide adequate assurances of the li-
censor's future performance to the licensee. 3
In any event, if the licensor fails to perform and the license does
not contain a "hell or high water" provision relating to payments by
the licensee, the licensee's obligation to pay the assignee (the secured
party) remains subject to any right of recoupment the licensee may
have against the licensor arising out the same transaction and may
also be subject to setoff rights.14 Thus, the licensee can reduce the
amount it owes to the assignee of the licensor by the amount of the
licensee's damages arising out of the licensor's nonperformance. 5
5. Waiver of Defense Clauses
It is not clear under current law whether a waiver of defenses by
an account debtor on a license of software is enforceable because
Current section 9-206 expressly validates waivers only by "buyers"
and "lessees" of goods and may displace non-Article 9 rules that
would otherwise validate the waiver.16 Revised Article 9 will validate
these clauses generally. 7 Such agreements can be made by all account
debtors. 8 Under Revised Article 9, the waiver is effective for the
benefit of the assignee of the original holder of the right to payment.59
IV. SECURITY INTEREST IN A LICENSEE'S RIGHTS UNDER A
LICENSE
A. The Right to Create and Perfect the Security Interest
1. What Revised Article 9 Does
Revised Article 9 also seeks to facilitate the ability of a licensee
of intellectual property to obtain financing secured by its rights under
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251; UNIF. COMPUTER INFO.
TRANSACTIONS ACT § 708 (1999); cf. U.C.C. § 2-210(5), 2-210 cmt. 6 (nonassigning party to
agreement entitled to "due assurance" that any delegated performance will be forthcoming);
U.C.C. § 2A-303 cmt. 5.
54. See U.C.C. § 9-318(1); R. § 9-404(a).
55. See R. § 9-404(a)(1). A secured party would typically require a "hell or high water"
provision.
56. See U.C.C. § 9-206(1).
57. See R. § 9-403. This is consistent with the better view of current law.
58. Persons who owe an obligation under an account, chattel paper, or general intangible.
See id. § 9-102(a)(3).
59. See id. § 9-403. The statute takes no position concerning the rights of the original holder
of the right to payment and leaves that question to the general law of contracts.
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the license. Revised Article 9 renders ineffective a restriction on the
transfer of a licensee's rights under a license 6° in the contract or arising
under other law, to the extent the restriction would interfere with the
creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest.61 Revised
Article 9 does not interfere with the enforceability of an otherwise ef-
fective restriction (in the contract or under other law62) on the secured
party's enforcement of its security interest in the license of the gen-
eral intangible.
63
Existing law generally permits creation and perfection of security
interests in otherwise nontransferable rights.64 The Drafting Commit-
tee modeled its approach on the law that applies to FCC licenses.
Well-established law permits creation, attachment, and perfection of
60. Section 9-408, instead of section 9-406 (discussed above), in addition to applying to a
security interest in a licensee's rights under a license, also applies to restrictions on the sale of
payment intangibles and promissory notes. The application of Article 9 to these transactions is
new. The application of section 9-408 to sales transactions assures account debtors under a
payment intangible and obligors under a promissory note that nothing under Article 9 will, in
the ordinary course, interfere with the account debtor's ability to continue to deal with the
original holder of the obligation. If the original holder of the payment intangible or promissory
note uses the payment obligation to secure an obligation, then section 9-406 will apply and it is
possible that a foreclosure of that security interest would require the account debtor or maker
to deal with the person that acquires the payment intangible or promissory note at the foreclo-
sure sale. Of course, in the circumstances of a promissory note, Article 3 may require the maker
of the promissory note to deal with a new holder of the note.
61. See R. § 9-408(a), (c). Subsections (a) and (c) of section 9-408 provide:
(a) ... [A] term in a promissory note or in an agreement between an account debtor
and a debtor which relates to a health-care-insurance receivable or a general in-
tangible, including a contract, permit, license, or franchise, and which term prohib-
its, restricts, or requires the consent of the person obligated on the promissory note
or the account debtor to, the assignment or transfer of, or creation, attachment, or
perfection of a security interest in, the promissory note, health-care-insurance re-
ceivable, or general intangible, is ineffective to the extent that the term:
(1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest; or
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest
may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termi-
nation, right of termination, or remedy under the promissory note, health-
care-insurance receivable, or general intangible.
(c) A rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent
of a government, governmental body or official, person obligated on a promissory
note, or account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or creation of a security
interest in, a promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangi-
ble, including a contract, permit, license, or franchise between an account debtor
and a debtor, is ineffective to the extent that the rule of law, statute, or regulation:
(1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest; or
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest
may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termi-
nation, right of termination, or remedy under the promissory note, health-
care-insurance receivable, or general intangible.
62. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (1981).
63. See R. § 9-408(d).
64. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-318(4).
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a security interest in the licensee's rights under an FCC license and
proceeds of that right, subject to the FCC's control over the actual en-
forcement of that security interest by the FCC's exercise of its power
to approve or disapprove a transferee. 61 The law that applies to FCC
licenses permits the enforcement of the security interest in the pro-
ceeds,66 but not the enforcement of the security interest in the FCC li-
cense itself, without the consent of the FCC.67 Surely the public policy
supporting the interest of the FCC in supervising who acts under an
FCC license is no less worthy of protection than the interest of a
software licensor in supervising who acts under a software license.
2. What Revised Article 9 Does Not Do
There are many things that Revised Article 9 does not do in con-
nection with permitting the creation and perfection of a security in-
terest in a licensee's interest. Revised Article 9 does not preempt con-
trary federal law. Revised Article 9 does not permit or enable a
licensee to grant a security interest in the licensor's property. A secu-
rity interest granted by a licensee attaches only to the licensee's
"rights in the collateral." 68 As stated in Official Comment 6 to section
9-203:
A debtor's limited rights in collateral, short of full ownership, are
sufficient for a security interest to attach. However, in accordance
with basic personal property conveyancing principles, the baseline
rule is that a security interest attaches only to whatever rights a
debtor may have, broad or limited as those rights may be.69
B. Limitations on Enforcement
1. Restrictions on Foreclosure
Section 9-408 permits a secured party to create and perfect a secu-
rity interest in a licensee's rights under a license despite otherwise en-
forceable prohibitions in the license or under other law against trans-
fers.70 The Drafting Committee designed section 9-408 to make the
value of otherwise nonassignable rights under a license available to
licensees so they can obtain more credit (and be more likely to pay
65. See, for example, MLQ Investors L.P. v. Pacific Quadracasting, Inc., 146 F.3d 746, 748
(9th Cir. 1998), and decisions cited in that opinion.
66. The security interest is created and perfected in the entire interest of the licensee.
67. See MLQ Investors, 146 F.3d at 748.
68. R. § 9-203(b)(2).
69. Id. § 9-203 cmt. 6 (emphasis added).
70. See id. § 9-408(d)-(e).
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their debts, including license fees).
Subsection 9-408(d)71 provides that nothing in section 9-408 over-
rides72 an otherwise enforceable contractual provision or rule of law
outside of Article 9 that would limit the secured party's ability to en-
force its security interest.73 The Drafting Committee specifically de-
signed this balanced approach to respond to the concerns of licen-
sors74 that a secured party not be able to use the licensee's rights
under the software license without the consent of the licensor.
75
71. Section 9-408(d) provides:
To the extent that a term in a promissory note or in an agreement between an account
debtor and a debtor which relates to a health-care-insurance receivable or general in-
tangible or a rule of law, statute, or regulation described in subsection (c) would be ef-
fective under law other than this article but is ineffective under subsection (a) or (c),
the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the promissory note,
health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible:
(1) is not enforceable against the person obligated on the promissory note or the ac-
count debtor;
(2) does not impose a duty or obligation on the person obligated on the promissory
note or the account debtor;
(3) does not require the person obligated on the promissory note or the account
debtor to recognize the security interest, pay or render performance to the secured
party, or accept payment or performance from the secured party;
(4) does not entitle the secured party to use or assign the debtor's rights under the
promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible, including
any related information or materials furnished to the debtor in the transaction
giving rise to the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general in-
tangible;
(5) does not entitle the secured party to use, assign, possess, or have access to any
trade secrets or confidential information of the person obligated on the promis-
sory note or the account debtor; and
(6) does not entitle the secured party to enforce the security interest in the promissory
note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible.
72. This language does not contain affirmative prohibitions on the secured party's en-
forcement of the security interest because it does not need to. Section 9-408 is an exception to
the enforceability of contract and legal restrictions on transfer. Absent the application of this
exception, any otherwise enforceable contractual or legal restriction on transfer remains in place
and enforceable. Article 9 does not interfere with the enforcement of those restrictions. Nor is it
the role of Article 9-designed to facilitate secured lending-to impose its own restrictions on
transfer.
73. This achieves exactly the same result as occurs under Article 2A with respect to the
leasing of goods. Section 2A-303(3) renders ineffective a prohibition in a personal property
lease prohibiting creation (or enforcement) of a security interest only where there is "an actual
transfer by the lessee of the lessee's right of possession or use of the goods." The creation and per-
fection is effective and no default under the lease occurs by reason of the creation or enforce-
ment of the security interest, in the absence of an "actual transfer" of use or possession. See
U.C.C. § 2A-303(3). This is the equivalent of the rule in Revised section 9-408 permitting crea-
tion and perfection, but not enforcement (in the face of an otherwise effective contractual or
non-Article 9 legal prohibition).
74. Section 9-408 makes frequent references to the "account debtor." Section 9-102(a)(3)
defines "account debtor" to include "a person obligated on ... [a] general intangible." Thus, the
term "account debtor" can refer to the licensor or the licensee, depending on the context. See R.
§ 9-408 cmt. 5.
75. Earlier in the drafting process, section 9-408(d) had a subsection stating that the licen-
see's creation of a security interest in its rights under the license does not create a security inter-
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There are many things that Article 9 of itself does not permit the
secured party to do in connection with the enforcement of its security
interest. Significantly:
" Revised Article 9 does not permit the secured party to en-
force in any way76 the security interest in the licensee's rights
under the license if other law prohibits enforcement or other
law would enforce a contractual restriction on enforce-
ment.
77
* Revised Article 9 does not permit the secured party to have
access to the licensor's proprietary or confidential informa-
tion as a result of the licensee granting a security interest in
its rights under the license.
78
Article 9 does not interfere with the licensor's ability to control
who will actually use the license. An otherwise effective term of the
license prohibiting enforcement will remain effective and any attempt
to enforce a security interest in that circumstance will result in a de-
fault.79 As stated in Official Comment 6 to section 9-408:
est in the licensor's rights. In July 1998, NCCUSL specifically considered and by a floor vote
decided to eliminate this provision. The elimination of the subsection was not a disapproval of
the rule stated in that subsection. The provision was not necessary because it is inherent in Arti-
cle 9 that a security interest attaches only to a debtor's rights in collateral. Section 9-203 ex-
pressly provides this rule. See id. § 9-203(b)(2). In a software license, the licensee's rights are
those rights it has under the license. The licensee has no rights in the licensor's intellectual
property itself.
76. Section 9-207 permits a secured party in "possession" of collateral to use the collateral
to the limited extent necessary to preserve its value. See id. § 9-207(b)(4)(A). There was a sug-
gestion that the Drafting Committee should make section 9-207 expressly subject to section
9-408, which preserves specific limits on a secured party's ability to use general intangibles (in-
cluding software). Section 9-207 applies only to tangible collateral, as intangibles are not suscep-
tible of "possession." See id. § 9-207 cmt. 7. In narrow circumstances, software is included in the
definition of goods (when the software is appropriately embedded or integrated into related
hardware). See id. § 9-102(a)(44). In those few circumstances, the obligations (and rights) of a
secured party in possession of the hardware would encompass the embedded software. Other-
wise, software is a "general intangible" not subject to "possession." See id. § 9-102(a)(42). Thus,
section 9-207 does not apply to software. In any event, under ordinary principles of statutory
construction, the very specific rules of section 9-408(d) would not be overridden by the general
rules of section 9-207.
77. See id. § 9-408(d).
7M See id.
79. Article 9 generally does not prevent a senior secured party from declaring a breach of
the security agreement if the debtor violates a negative pledge clause. See id. § 9-401(b). Some
suggested that the licensor should have the same kind of right. The rule of section 9-408 is dif-
ferent from the negative pledge clause because under Article 9 a senior secured party is re-
quired to recognize a junior secured party, has duties (and potential liabilities) to a junior se-
cured party, and has the risk of the junior secured party causing the loss of the collateral. See id.
§§ 9-601 to 9-624. This is the reason that it is appropriate for a senior secured party in that cir-
cumstance to have a right to declare a breach. When a licensee grants a security interest in its
rights, the licensor does not have to recognize the secured party and the secured party has no
right to use the license. As a result, the licensor has no risk of liability to the licensee's secured
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However, subsection (d) ensures that these affected persons are not
affected adversely. That provision removes any burdens or adverse
effects on these persons for which any rational basis could exist to
restrict the effectiveness of an assignment or to exercise any reme-
dies. For this reason, the effects of subsections (a) and (c) are imma-
terial insofar as those persons are concerned. 80
2. Grabbing the Proceeds
Once the licensee's rights have been transformed into money, the
licensor no longer has an intellectual property interest to protect. If
the licensee does transfer its rights (for example, with the consent of
the licensor, pursuant to a bankruptcy court orders or otherwise), the
secured party is entitled to enforce its security interest in the proceeds
generated by a transfer of the licensee's rights.82 That does not inter-
fere with the licensor's interest in controlling who uses the licensee's
rights under the license.
83
3. The Licensor Can Enforce the Balance of the License
As noted above, a secured party of the licensee would have a se-
curity interest only in whatever rights the licensee has under its li-
cense. Except as stated in section 9-408, nothing in Article 9 cuts off
the licensor's contract rights against the licensee. The licensee's de-
fault84 under the license would trigger whatever contractual termina-
tion rights the licensor has. Except for the ability of a secured party to
obtain and perfect a security interest in the licensee's rights under the
license, the creation and perfection of the security interest in favor of
the licensee's secured party in the licensee's rights would have no ef-
fect on the rights of the licensor. Indeed, nothing in section 9-408 pre-
vents the licensor from providing that the secured party's enforce-
ment efforts trigger a default under the license to the extent
contemplated by section 9-408(d).
party.
80. Id. § 9-408 cmt. 6 (emphasis added).
81. Note that the Bankruptcy Court may lack the power to permit the licensee to transfer
its rights without the consent of the licensor. See Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment, Inc. (In re
Catapult Entertainment, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1999).
82. The security interest was created and perfected in the licensee's entire interest under
the license.
83. See R. § 9-408 cmts. 7-8.
84. Excluding, as a result of section 9-408, any assertion that a default under the license can
be based on the secured party's obtaining or perfecting its security interest.
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V. LICENSEES IN ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS
A. Protecting "Ordinary Course" Transactions
1. What Section 9-321 Is About
Article 9's effort to facilitate commerce sometimes requires the
protection of people other than a secured party or the borrower. For
example, an owner of a motion picture (a producer, for example) may
grant a security interest in the owner's intellectual property. 85 The
owner may then enter into an exclusive license with a distributor of
the firm. The distributor too may grant a security interest in its rights
as a licensee. The distributor may then enter into nonexclusive li-
censes with exhibitors. 86 Alternatively, the owner may enter into non-
exclusive licenses with distributors or directly with exhibitors or end-
users.8 7 The holders of "off-the-shelf" nonexclusive licenses likely
have reasonable expectations that (as long as they perform their obli-
gations) they will continue to have the right to use the license even if
their licensor loses its rights as a result of a foreclosure by the licen-
sor's secured party.
2. What Section 9-321 Does
Section 9-32188 provides (in part) that a nonexclusive licensee
(but not an exclusive licensee) of a general intangible (including a
copyright) in ordinary course of business "takes free" of a security in-
terest created by its immediate licensor.89 Thus an ordinary course
85. That property would, in significant part, likely be a copyright.
86. Under current practices, a security agreement between a secured party and a producer
or a secured party and a distributor will often authorize the borrower to enter into licenses of
the type protected by section 9-321. Distribution agreements also frequently provide contractu-
ally that the licensor cannot terminate any end-user licenses that were entered into prior to the
default by the distributor that resulted in termination of the distributor's license.
87. A similar structure might occur in software distribution.
88. Section 9-321 provides in part:
(a) In this section, "licensee in ordinary course of business" means a person that be-
comes a licensee of a general intangible in good faith, without knowledge that the
license violates the rights of another person in the general intangible, and in the
ordinary course from a person in the business of licensing general intangibles of
that kind. A person becomes a licensee in the ordinary course if the license to the
person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind of business in
which the licensor is engaged or with the licensor's own usual or customary prac-
tices.
(b) A licensee in ordinary course of business takes its rights under a nonexclusive li-
cense free of a security interest in the general intangible created by the licensor,
even if the security interest is perfected and the licensee knows of its existence.
89. To the extent the license included copyrighted material, it seems quite possible that the
Copyright Act would preempt the application of section 9-321 to a license in this circumstance.
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nonexclusive license will survive the secured party's foreclosure
against its licensor ° As discussed below, for policy reasons a nonex-
clusive licensee should have this protection.91
3. What Section 9-321 Does Not Do
Section 9-321 affects the relative rights of a secured party and a
licensee from the secured party's borrower. It has no effect on the
relative rights of a licensor and its licensee. Thus, it has no effect on a
provision in a license that prohibits a licensee from entering into non-
exclusive sublicenses. 92 Nor does it protect a nonexclusive sublicensee
who obtains its sublicense from the licensee of the borrower.
4. So, How Does This Work?
Thus, in the example given above, an exhibitor holds a nonexclu-
sive license granted by a distributor that holds an exclusive license
from a producer. If the distributor's secured party forecloses, the
nonexclusive licensee would continue to enjoy its rights under the li-
cense (assuming it performs its obligations). If the producer's secured
party forecloses, however, the distributor holding a subsequent-in-
time, exclusive license would lose its rights. The rights of the exhibi-
Peregrine and Avalon suggest so. See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
(In re Peregrine Entertainment, Inc.), 116 B.R. 194, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1990); In re Avalon Soft-
ware, Inc., 209 B.R. 517, 521 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997); see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
6, at § 10.07[B] n.40 ("Note that 'recordation of transfer' [of the copyright mortgage] will give
priority to such transfer as against a nonexclusive license taken after such recordation."). This
article does not attempt to analyze that question.
90. Some form of this provision has been in every draft of Revised Article 9 since 1996 and
also of UCITA since the first draft of UCITA in January 1996 (it has been dropped from
UCITA as part of the removal of all secured financing provisions from UCITA). It does not
appear that anyone raised any objection to it during the discussions of UCITA's financing pro-
visions during meetings of the UCITA Drafting Committee.
91. A secured party can seek to prevent even a nonexclusive licensee from obtaining the
rights under the license "free" of the security interest by appropriate contract agreements with
the licensor in the security agreement. A nonexclusive licensee in the ordinary course can
achieve that status only if it meets the tests of section 9-321(a), including the absence of knowl-
edge of the negative covenant in the security agreement (though knowledge alone of the exis-
tence of the security interest is not disqualifying).
92. Although such a provision would, of course, be most unlikely since by definition section
9-321 only comes into play with respect to nonexclusive licenses granted in the ordinary course.
Thus, section 9-321 would have no effect in the non-Article 9 software financing structures de-
scribed above. See supra Part II.D. In those transactions, the licensor could place a provision in
its license to the financed licensee that any sublicense entered into by the licensee must include
a provision terminating the sublicense if the licensor or the financing party terminates the li-
cense held by the financed licensee. The provision would likely go on to provide that any subli-
cense that did not include such a provision was invalid. Nothing in Article 9 would have any ef-
fect on the enforceability of that provision. That provision would remain enforceable if the
licensor sold its rights to a finance company (captive or otherwise).
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tor, as a nonexclusive sublicensee, would also fall because section
9-321 protects it only as against the secured party of its immediate
sublicensor (the distributor).
93
B. So What Does "Takes Free" Mean?
The phrase "takes free" does not mean that the nonexclusive li-
censee gets a "free" license. The nonexclusive licensee may continue
to use the license following the secured party's foreclosure against the
licensor only if the nonexclusive licensee complies with all of the
terms (including payment of license fees to the person that acquired
the licensor's interest at the foreclosure sale) of the license. Thus all
of the licensee's obligations remain in place and the licensor's succes-
sor may terminate the license for nonperformance by the licensee.
C. How Do We Know When a License is "Nonexclusive"?
Article 9 does not contain a definition of "nonexclusive" license.
If UCITA has been enacted in the relevant jurisdiction, it would seem
likely that a court might look to UCITA's definition of a "nonexclu-
sive" license. UCITA has a very narrow definition of "nonexclusive"
license in section 102(a)(48). Thus, the corresponding meaning of
"exclusive" license is very broad. Under UCITA, a license does not
qualify as "nonexclusive" if it in any way "precludes" the licensor
from entering into another license with another licensee within the
same "scope." 94 UCITA in turn defines "scope" to include the "use"
of the licensed information.95 Thus, any license that prevents the li-
censor from entering into any other license within the same "scope" is
an "exclusive" license. Accordingly, if a license contains any restric-
tion on the licensor's right to enter into a competitive license, the li-
cense is "exclusive" and section 9-321 would not provide the exclusive
licensee with any protection.
It is also likely that a court would look to well-established law
under the Copyright Act for guidance as to the meaning of "nonex-
93. However, under the "shelter" doctrine, if a nonexclusive licensee did qualify for protec-
tion under section 9-321 from a foreclosure conducted by a secured party of the nonexclusive
licensee's licensor, any person that had a sublicense from the nonexclusive licensee would be
protected to the same extent. See generally U.C.C. § 3-203(b), 3-203 cmt. 2 (transferee of in-
strument obtains rights of transferor, including any status of transferor as a holder in due
course).
94. See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 102(a)(48) (1999).
95. See id. § 102(a)(61)(B); see also U.C.C. § 2B-209 cmt. 5 (Draft Feb. 1999) ("rights to a
screen play for use in television" is a "scope" issue).
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clusive" license. As noted in Nimmer on Copyright, there is "no limit
on how narrow the scope of licensed rights may be" and still consti-
tute an "exclusive license." 96 Thus, with UCITA, copyright law gives
a very narrow definition to a nonexclusive license and a correspond-
ingly broad definition to an exclusive license. 97
This common sense meaning fits well with the purposes of sec-
tion 9-321-to protect "off the shelf," ordinary course transactions
with the borrower's customers. If a license contains restrictions on the
licensor's ability to enter into other licenses, it is highly likely some
negotiation is going on between the licensor and the licensee. In this
circumstance, it is not unreasonable to expect that the licensee should
have to deal with the licensor's secured party.
98
D. Why Protect Ordinary Course of Business Licensees?
Section 9-32199 seeks to balance two legitimate interests:
* the ability of a secured party to have recourse to its collat-
eral, and
* the ability of an ordinary course of business licensee of the
collateral to retain the licensee's rights without interference
from the secured party of the licensor.
Article 9 balances these interests by protecting the customer
when the customer is a direct customer of the borrower. However,
Article 9 protects the secured party when the customer is not a direct
customer of the debtor of the secured party. Article 9 favors the se-
cured party in the latter circumstance not because downstream cus-
tomers are not worthy of protection but because in those circum-
stances the burden on the secured party to attempt to control a
downstream sublicensor outweighs the benefits to the downstream
customer.
It would not be fair to a secured party for remote transactions to
96. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 10.02[A].
97. See id.
98. It has been suggested that all oral licenses, even if exclusive in substance, are "nonex-
clusive" licenses because of section 204(a) of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994).
That section does not say that. It says that if the content of a license is "exclusive," then the ex-
clusive license is not enforceable unless it is in writing. It does not convert oral exclusive licenses
into oral nonexclusive licenses. A "licensee" under an exclusive oral license gets nothing. The
holder of an oral license has an enforceable license only if the holder can prove that the owner
of the copyright granted the oral licensee a nonexclusive license.
99. This is a rule of convenience in line with numerous statutory, common, and civil law
rules protecting innocent ordinary course transferees. See U.C.C. § 2A-307(3); U.C.C. § 9-307;
R. § 9-320.
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adversely affect its rights. The secured party is in a position to moni-
tor and influence by contract the activities only of its borrower. The
secured party does not have any contractual rights against remote
parties. At the same time, it is fair to protect the direct customer of
the secured party's borrower because the secured party is in a posi-
tion to oversee the activities of its borrower. Thus, Article 9 imposes
on the secured party the risk of its own borrower's activities but not
the risk of the activities of remote persons. The actions of remote
downstream customers would not affect the secured party's security
interest.
This reflects a balancing of the interests, expectations, and bur-
dens of the various participants. For example, it indicates that a pru-
dent secured party should "police" its own borrower against the bor-
rower entering into nonexclusive licenses. However, it does not
require the secured party to "police" its borrower's licensees against
entering into nonexclusive sublicenses because that would place too
great a burden on the secured party. At the same time, it protects the
reasonable expectations of nonexclusive licensees (generally nonne-
gotiated transactions) that their rights are not subject to termination
as a consequence of the licensor's default. Section 9-321 provides a
statutory rule that implements what the secured party and the licen-
sor undoubtedly expect-the secured party will routinely authorize
the licensor to enter into ordinary course transactions. That, after all,
is the business the licensor runs. However, even that expectation in-
terest is outweighed by the burden that would be imposed on the
original licensor's secured party if it had to "police" the sublicensing
activities of all exclusive licensee's. Finally, the rules adopt a policy
that it is not asking too much for an exclusive licensee (who is more
likely to be negotiating its deal) either to make a deal with the licen-
sor's secured party to protect the exclusive licensee or to take its li-
cense subject to the security interest granted by the licensor.
If the secured party to the licensor does not want to encourage
nonexclusive licenses, it can, in its security agreement (or elsewhere),
require the borrower (the licensor) to place in all of the nonexclusive
licenses the borrower grants a provision that the nonexclusive license
will terminate if the licensor's secured party forecloses. Nothing in
section 9-321 or elsewhere in Article 9 would interfere with the en-
forcement of such a provision as between the secured party and its
borrower. Ordinarily, of course, the borrower is in the business of
granting nonexclusive licenses and the secured party expects the bor-
rower to use the fees paid under those licenses to pay the secured
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debt.
This is a perfectly logical allocation of the risks and burdens and
this allocation has been widely used in the UCC since its adoption. 1°°
This rule mirrors the existing rules for buyers and lessees of goods. 1°1
E. Winning and Losing
Revised section 9-321 works very well in the common distribu-
tion structures for motion pictures. There, the owner of intellectual
property grants a security interest in the intellectual property to a se-
cured party who perfects its security interest. Typically in a motion
picture transaction, the owner of the intellectual property (the pro-
ducer) may grant a security interest in its intellectual property and
then enter into an exclusive license with a distributor, who in turn
may enter into nonexclusive sublicenses. Under section 9-321, if the
owner of the intellectual property defaults under its obligation to the
secured party, the secured party can foreclose and "wipe out" the ex-
clusive license. The nonexclusive sublicense falls with the exclusive
license because 9-321 protects nonexclusive licensees only from those
security interests granted by their immediate licensor (here the dis-
tributor).102
A secured party financing a licensor 10 3 would "lose" if the licen-
sor entered into a nonexclusive license agreement with, say, a dis-
tributor, who would then "take free" of the secured party's security
100. Some have said that licenses of software should work like real estate leases-if a lender
to an owner of real estate forecloses on the real estate, any leases entered into following the re-
cording of the deed of trust or mortgage will be "wiped out." Similarly they argue, so should a
nonexclusive license entered into after the licensor has granted a security interest in its intellec-
tual property. This is an inapt analogy. A lease of real property is like an exclusive license be-
cause only one tenant can occupy any piece of real property at any one time. Article 9 is to the
same effect: an exclusive license of intellectual property is "wiped out" by the foreclosure of a
prior security interest in the intellectual property. Prospective tenants of real estate who con-
template making major investments in their tenancies are accustomed to protecting their quiet
enjoyment vis-A-vis mortgagees. That rule places no undue burden or cost on the transaction.
101. There has also been some suggestion to limit this rule to nonexclusive licensees who are
consumers. Current law has no such limitation for ordinary course lessees and buyers of goods.
See U.C.C. § 2A-307(3); U.C.C. § 9-307(1). All ordinary course buyers of goods, lessees of
goods, and nonexclusive licensees of software are entitled to this protection. The rationale ex-
plained above provides no basis for limiting this to consumer transactions. This rule has nothing
to do with bargaining power; it is based on reasonable expectations and efficiency grounds. Thus
it is equally appropriate in commercial and consumer transactions.
102. See R. § 9-321(b).
103. As noted above, this is only relevant if the Copyright Act does not preempt these issues
to the extent the collateral includes copyrights. The Nimmer treatise, Peregrine, and Avalon
suggest quite strongly that preemption does occur. See supra note 89.
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interest in the licensed general intangible.1°4 It is most likely, as a
business matter, that a distributor would enter into a nonexclusive li-
cense. Again, if the license is exclusive, Revised section 9-321 would
not apply.
Even in the unlikely event that an owner of intellectual property
and its distributor might enter into a nonexclusive license, the owner's
secured party could seek to protect the buyer at the foreclosure sale
by requiring in the security agreement with the licensor that all li-
censes entered into by the licensor contain a provision providing for
the termination of the license in the event the secured party fore-
closes. If, nevertheless, the owner of the intellectual property entered
into an ordinary course of business nonexclusive license with a dis-
tributor, then that is what the distributor would have -a nonexclusive
license. When the secured party foreclosed against the producer, the
buyer at the foreclosure sale would acquire all of the producer's rights
and would be free to enter into any license the secured party felt like
entering into with any person. Upon foreclosure, the buyer at the
foreclosure sale would become entitled to all performance (including
payment obligations) that the nonexclusive licensee owed to the bor-
rower (licensor).
VI. PMSIS
A. PMSIs in Intellectual Property
Revised Article 9, like Former Article 9, provides statutory su-
perpriority to a purchase money security interest ("PMSI") in goods.
As discussed below, this superpriority now expressly includes soft-
ware when there is a PMSI in related hardware. The Drafting Com-
mittee considered whether to extend superpriority to PMSIs in soft-
ware generally. The Drafting Committee decided not to do that. If a
secured party that has a security interest in software desires superpri-
ority, it can seek to obtain a subordination agreement with the prior
secured party.105 Today, with respect to goods, software, or any other
kind of collateral, a secured party who provides new value and per-
fects its security interest after another secured party has perfected its
security interest will commonly negotiate an intercreditor agreement
with the first secured party.
104. That is, the distributor would have the right to use the license for so long as it complies
with all terms of the license, including paying all license fees to the secured party.
105. See U.C.C. § 9-316; R. § 9-339.
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B. The History of Software PMSIs Under Revised Article 9
Due to insufficient certainty about the reach of current law on
the subject, many experienced Article 9 lawyers are unwilling under
current law to rely on the availability of a statutory superpriority for a
PMSI in software. 106 Before any consideration of how to treat soft-
ware, the Drafting Committee made a considered decision to resolve
the ambiguity under Current Article 9 by limiting superpriority to
PMSIs in "goods." The Drafting Committee did not believe that the
marketplace indicated a need to have the purchase money superpri-
ority apply to other types of collateral.
Later, the Article 9 Drafting Committee invited representatives
of leading software financing institutions to make a presentation on
the issue of PMSIs in software to the Drafting Committee. Those per-
sons did so. The Drafting Committee then discussed, at two meetings,
how to proceed. The Article 9 Drafting Committee decided not to
provide for PMSIs in software generally.
C. Limited Software PMSIs
In recognition of the arguments made by these lenders, the
Drafting Committee did decide to provide superpriority to PMSIs in
software when combined with a PMSI in related hardware. This
probably expands the availability of purchase money superpriority
from that available under current law. As a result, those providing fi-
nancing for the acquisition of software (and the related hardware) re-
ceive a special benefit under Revised Article 9. Software is the only
intangible for which superpriority is provided under a PMSI. The ex-
ception permits a PMSI in software if the debtor acquired its interest
in the software
" for the principal purpose of using the software on hardware
in which the secured party also has a PMSI, and
* in an integrated transaction with the acquisition of the re-
lated hardware.07
106. See U.C.C. § 9-312(4). This subsection refers to the debtor's "possession" of the PMSI
collateral. This suggests that this means that PMSI priority is not available for intangible collat-
eral that the secured party cannot "possess."
107. See R. § 9-103(c).
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D. Why Limited Availability of Software PMSIs Does Not Matter
1. Superpriority by Agreement
The current PMSI provisions provide for a statutory superprior-
ity for certain collateral under specified conditions.1°8 In all situations,
however, under both Current and Revised Article 9, a secured party
can obtain priority by agreement. 1°9
2. No Limitations on Other Aspects of the Security Interest
The limited availability of obtaining a PMSI in software does not
prevent a lender financing the licensee's acquisition of rights in soft-
ware from obtaining a security interest in the licensee's rights in the
software (facilitated by section 9-408 as discussed above) and thereby
defeating any claims of a licensee's bankruptcy trustee.10 The limita-
tion affects only the matter of superpriority
3. PMSIs in Software Would Not Help Much
Under Current Article 9, a PMSI in a licensee's right to use soft-
ware may not do the secured party much good. Most decisions under
Current Article 9 do not treat rights arising under an agreement for
the short-term use of collateral (which might well include a license) as
"proceeds" of the property used.' The courts may conclude that a
sublicense may not be "proceeds" of a sublicensor's rights under a li-
cense under current law because the creation of the sublicense does
not involve a "disposition" of the master license."' Thus, under cur-
rent law, the only benefit of permitting a PMSI in a licensee's rights in
software would be to create PMSI superpriority in the license itself.
The security interest probably would not extend to the payment rights
arising from a sublicense (as putative "proceeds" of the license).
Even if the sublicense to the end-user constituted "proceeds" of
the license, the PMSI superpriority would not extend to those pro-
ceeds. Under current law, the superpriority applies to "proceeds" of
108. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)-(4).
109. See id. § 9-316; R. § 9-339.
110. As discussed above, many financing arrangements by licensors for licensees do not cre-
ate a "security interest." In these circumstances, the licensor may consider itself much better off
as a non-Article 9 creditor that can exercise its termination right without regard to the foreclo-
sure rules in Article 9.
111. See, e.g., CLC Equip. Co. v. Brewer (In re Value-Added Communications, Inc.), 139
F.3d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 1998).
112. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1); PEB COMMENTARY NO. 9, LEASE RENTALS AS PROCEEDS
(1992) (lease payments for goods constitute "proceeds" of the goods).
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PMSI inventory collateral only to the extent the proceeds are cash re-
ceived on or before "delivery" of the collateral by the borrower to the
end-user."3 The PMSI superpriority does not extend to accounts,
chattel paper, instruments, or other "proceeds."
Asset-based lenders routinely have a negative covenant in their
loan agreements prohibiting other secured lending, including PMSI
lending. Thus, under Current Article 9, even if the superpriority ex-
tended to other "proceeds," it would not avoid the need to seek ap-
proval to obtain the PMSI from an existing blanket lender who has
obtained a negative covenant.
Under Revised Article 9, a secured party with a security interest
in software already fares much better than under prior law, even
without PMSI superpriority.1 4 A license is "proceeds" of the licen-
sor's intellectual property under Revised Article 9, which includes the
rights to payment under a "license" in the definition of "proceeds."'' 5
So at least under Revised Article 9, a security interest in the intellec-
tual property will continue in the rights arising out of a license or a
sublicense and the secured party (or other successor) who acquires
the collateral upon foreclosure will step into the debtor's shoes with
the right to enforce those rights. The superpriority for goods (as in-
ventory) does not extend to accounts arising from the use of the col-
lateral. 6 Similarly, even if a secured party could obtain a PMSI in a
licensee's rights, the PMSI superpriority in software would not extend
to amounts owed under a sublicense. To that extent the superpriority
would have only a limited benefit."7 Nothing in Revised Article 9
would affect the enforceability of the senior lender's negative cove-
nant against other security interests, including a PMSI.
4. PMSIs Are Not Necessary
When a licensor "finances" its licensee, as discussed above, the
113. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3). The PMSI superpriority does extend to proceeds of noninven-
tory PMSI collateral, such as equipment. See id. § 9-312(4). Presumably, if a PMSI in software
had been allowed under Revised Article 9, the inventory rules would have applied.
114. Although a financier may consider itself still better off as a non-Article 9 party in one
of the structures discussed above.
115. See R. § 9-102(a)(64)(A).
116. The security interest, however, does remain attached to the accounts as "proceeds" of
the license.
117. Master licensors could try to force distributors to modify their business practices to re-
quire notes for payment so the superpriority would continue in those notes. Then, if the licen-
see's blanket secured party perfected only by filing, the PMSI secured party could take posses-
sion of the notes and defeat the blanket security interest. This is cumbersome, and it seems
unlikely that most end-users would agree to deliver a note.
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license transaction itself generally is not a "secured transaction." The
licensor's right to terminate the license is not subject to Article 9 rules
nor is it affected by prior or subsequent security interests granted by
the licensee to its secured party. Thus, under current law, the licen-
sor's termination right outside of Article 9 gives the licensor every bit
as much protection as it would have with a PMSI because the PMSI
superpriority does not extend beyond the master license for the sev-
eral reasons identified above. Under the new law, the same protection
is provided.
CONCLUSION
Revised Article 9 facilitates the financing of intellectual property
and in the process carefully balances the interests of licensors, licen-
sees, and secured parties. The results are practical and fair.

